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Abstract
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences
in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their oppo-
nents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and
show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy
the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium
for all ε ∈ [0,1).
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11 Introduction
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environ-
ments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents.
Now, if an individual is uncertain about the rationality of his opponents, which
conjectures about his opponents’ actions should he form? This is a very intricate issue.
Admittedly, he can form a subjective probabilistic assessment and play a best response
to his assessment. However, any subjective assessment is largely arbitrary, and there
is no obvious reasons to favor one assessment over another. Bayesian theory is silent
on how to form initial probabilistic assessments. Moreover, experimental evidence such
as the Ellsberg paradox suggests that individuals frequently experience diﬃculties in
forming a unique assessment. In this note, we postulate that “regret” guides individuals
in forming probabilistic assessments and, ultimately, in making choices. Speciﬁcally, we
consider the concept of ε-minimax regret equilibrium as the solution concept (Renou
and Schlag (2009)).
In an ε-minimax regret equilibrium, each player believes that his opponents are
playing according to the equilibrium strategies with probability 1−ε, and is completely
uncertain about the play of his opponents, otherwise. Whenever uncertain about the play
of his opponents, a player conjectures that his opponents would play so as to maximize
his regret. In particular, there is no mutual belief in rationality in an ε-minimax regret
equilibrium (unless ε = 0). Intuitively, if a player believes with probability one that
his opponents are rational, he must conclude that his opponents will not play strictly
dominated strategies. However, this might contradict his conjecture that his opponents
aims at maximizing his regret with probability ε: strictly dominated strategies might
maximize his regret. The parameter ε thus captures the extent to which players are
doubtful about the rationality of others: the higher ε is, the more doubtful a player is.
We show that the social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and sat-
isfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for
any ε < 1. Perhaps surprising, this result states that even arbitrarily large uncertain-
ties about the rationality of others does not undermine the implementation of social
correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy no-veto power. We also show
that Maskin monotonicity is not a necessary condition for implementation in ε-minimax
regret equilibrium, even when implementation is required for all ε ∈ (0,1). A larger set
2of social choice correspondences can be implemented.
For excellent surveys on implementation theory, we refer the reader to Jackson (2001)
and Maskin and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2002). A closely related contribution to our work is Tumen-
nasan (2008), who studies the problem of implementation in quantal response equi-
librium. The distinctive feature of this solution concept is that players make errors
in evaluating their payoﬀs and, thus, may play sub-optimal strategies. Tumennasan
makes, however, two additional and key assumptions. Firstly, he considers limiting
quantal response equilibrium, i.e., as the probability of errors goes to zero. Secondly,
he requires each limiting quantal response equilibrium to be a strict Nash equilibrium.
These two additional assumptions makes the problem of implementation in quantal re-
sponse equilibrium essentially equivalent to the problem of implementation in strict Nash
equilibria. He shows that quasi-monotonicity together with a condition termed no-worst
alternatives are necessary and almost suﬃcient conditions for implementation.1 Quasi-
monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity do not imply each others. Unlike Tumennasan,
we do not reﬁne the set of ε-minimax regret equilibria and, in fact, show that neither
Maskin monotonicity nor quasi-monotonicity are necessary conditions for implementa-
tion in ε-minimax regret equilibrium.
2 Preliminaries
An environment is a triplet  N,X,Θ  where N := {1,...,n} is a set of n players, X a
ﬁnite set of alternatives, and Θ a ﬁnite set of states of the world. For each player i ∈ N,
there is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : X × Θ → R.
We denote by Li(x,θ) := {y ∈ X : ui(x,θ) ≥ ui(y,θ)} player i’s lower contour set of
x at state θ.
A social choice correspondence f : Θ → 2X \ {∅} associates with each state of
the world θ a non-empty subset of alternatives f(θ) ⊆ X. Two classic conditions for
Nash implementation are Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power. A social choice
correspondence f is Maskin monotonic if for all (x,θ,θ′) in X × Θ × Θ with x ∈ f(θ),
we have x ∈ f(θ′) whenever Li(x,θ) ⊆ Li(x,θ′) for all i ∈ N. Maskin monotonicity is a
1For suﬃciency, he also needs the no-veto power condition. For the problem of implementation in
strict Nash equilibrium, Cabrales and Serrano (2008) show that quasi-monotonicity and the condition
of no-worst alternatives are necessary and almost suﬃcient conditions.
3necessary condition for Nash implementation. A social choice correspondence f satisﬁes
no-veto power if for all θ ∈ Θ, we have x ∈ f(θ) whenever x ∈ argmaxx′∈X ui(x′,θ) for
all but at most one player i ∈ N. Maskin monotonicity and no-veto power are suﬃcient
conditions for Nash implementation (if n ≥ 3). Denote FNE the set of social choice
correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisﬁes the no-veto power condition.
A mechanism (or game form) is a pair  (Mi)i∈N,g  with Mi the set of messages of
player i, and g : ×i∈NMi → X the allocation rule. Let M := ×j∈NMj and M−i :=
×j∈N\{i}Mj, with m and m−i generic elements, respectively.
A mechanism  (Mi)i∈N,g  together with a state θ induce a strategic-form game G(θ)
as follows. There is a set N of n players. The set of pure actions of player i is Mi, and
player i’s payoﬀ when he plays mi and his opponents play m−i is ui(g(mi,m−i),θ). Let
Σi be the set of mixed strategies of player i and denote Σ−i := ×j∈N\{i}Σj, with generic
elements σi and σ−i, respectively.
The aim of this paper is to study the problem of full implementation when players
behave according to the solution concept of ε-minimax regret equilibrium (Renou and
Schlag (2009)). Before deﬁning our solution concept, we wish to stress that the concern
for minimizing maximal regret does not arise from any behavioral or emotional consider-
ations. Rather, it is a consequence of relaxing some of the axioms of subjective expected
utility (e.g., the axiom of independence to irrelevant alternatives); we refer the reader to
Hayashi (2008) or Stoye (2008) for recent axiomatizations. At state θ, player i’s ex-post






i,m−i),θ) − ui(g(mi,m−i),θ). (1)
Player i’s regret is thus the diﬀerence between player i’s payoﬀ when the proﬁle of
messages (mi,m−i) is played and the highest payoﬀ he would have got, had he known that
his opponents were playing m−i. With a slight abuse of notation, we write ri((σi,σ−i),θ)
for the expected regret when the proﬁle (σi,σ−i) of mixed strategies is played. A proﬁle
of strategies (σ∗
i,σ∗




















i ∈ Σi, for all i ∈ N.
4Let us brieﬂy comment on our solution concept. In an ε-minimax regret equilibrium
(σ∗
i,σ∗
−i), player i believes that his opponents are playing σ∗
−i with probability 1 − ε
and is completely uncertain about the play of his opponents, otherwise. And whenever
uncertain about the play of his opponents, player i conjectures that his opponents play
so as to maximize his regret. In particular, this implies that there is no mutual belief in
rationality (unless ε = 0). To see this, suppose that there are only two players, 1 and
2, that player 2 has a strictly dominant action and player 1 believes with probability
one that player 2 is rational. Since player 1 is certain that player 2 is rational, player
1 must conjecture that player 2 plays his strictly dominant action with probability
one. However, the strictly dominant action of player 2 might not coincide with the
action that maximizes player 1’s regret. According to our solution concept, player 1
might therefore conjecture that player 2 plays a strictly dominated action with strictly
positive probability (at most ε, however), a contradiction with his belief about player 2’s
rationality. (See Example 1.) The parameter ε quantiﬁes the beliefs in rationality: the
higher ε, the more doubtful a player is about the rationality of his opponents. Similarly,
there is no common belief in conjectures (unless ε = 0). Two additional remarks are in
order. Firstly, the concept of ε-minimax regret equilibrium with ε = 0 coincides with
the concept of Nash equilibrium. Secondly, if ε = 1, there is no strategic considerations:
a player simply minimizes his maximal regret, without making inferences about the play
of his opponents, given his knowledge of their payoﬀs and the fact that they minimize
maximal regret. We refer the reader to Renou and Schlag (2009) for additional results.
Deﬁnition 1 Fix ε ∈ [0,1]. The mechanism  (Mi)i∈N,g  implements the social choice
correspondence f in ε-minimax regret equilibrium if for all θ ∈ Θ, the following two
conditions hold:
(i) For each x ∈ f(θ), there exists an ε-minimax regret equilibrium m∗ of G(θ) such
that g(m∗) = x.
(ii) If σ is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium of G(θ), then g(m) ∈ f(θ) for all m in the
support of σ.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that our deﬁnition of implementation
in ε-minimax regret equilibrium follows Maskin (1999)’s deﬁnition and, in particular,
considers mixed strategies in part (ii). This contrasts with most of the literature on
5Nash implementation: with the notable exceptions of Maskin (1999) and Mezzetti and
Renou (2009), mixed strategies are not considered in this literature.2 With the concept
of ε-minimax regret equilibrium, however, it is fundamental to consider mixed strategies:
unlike the concept of Nash equilibrium, a player might be indiﬀerent between two pure
actions and yet strictly prefers a mixture of the two over each one.3 We now illustrate
our concept of implementation in ε-minimax regret equilibrium with the help of a simple
example.
Example 1. There are two players, 1 and 2, two states of the world, θ and θ′, and
four alternatives, a, b, c, and d. The utilities are represented in the table below. For
instance, at state θ, player 1’s payoﬀ of a is 10, while player 2’s payoﬀ is 2.
θ θ′
1 2 1 2
a 10 2 5 5
b 4 5 1 0
c 5 0 0 1
d 5 1 0 0
Consider the social choice function f with f(θ) = d and f(θ′) = a. It is imple-
mentable in Nash equilibrium (Maskin (1999)), as well as in rationalizable outcomes
(Bergemann, Morris and Tercieux (2009)). A simple mechanism to implement f is the
following: each player i has two messages mi and m′







In particular, at state θ, the strategic-form game G(θ) is:
2Note a substantial diﬀerence between Maskin (1999) and Mezzetti and Renou (2009): in part (i) of
the deﬁnition of implementation, Maskin does not consider mixed Nash equilibria, while Mezzetti and
Renou do.
3This follows from the axiomatization of the minimax regret criterion, which requires the uncertainty
axiom. The uncertainty axiom says that if an individual is indiﬀerent between two acts, he prefers a






So, if player 1 is certain that player 2 is rational, then (m′
1,m′
2) is the unique rationaliz-
able outcome, hence the unique Nash equilibrium. Suppose now that player 1 has some
doubts about the rationality of player 2 and, thus, is not certain that player 2 plays
his strictly dominant action m′
2. Assume that player 1 believes that player 2 is rational
with probability 1−ε and, thus, believes that player 2 plays m′
2 with probability at least
1−ε. With probability ε, player 1 is completely uncertain about the play of player 2 and
conjectures that player 2 plays so as to maximize his (player 1) regret. We argue that
(m′
1,m′
2) is nonetheless the unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium whenever ε is small
enough.
Clearly, it is optimal for player 2 to play his strictly dominant action m′
2. Now, if
player 1 considers playing m′
1, his maximal regret is 5ε. With probability 1 − ε, player
1 believes that player 2 is rational and thus plays m′
2, in which case m′
1 is player 1’s
best reply. With probability ε, player 1 conjectures that player 2 maximizes his (player
1) regret, and thus plays m2. In that case, m1 (and not m′
1) is the best reply, so that
the regret is 5.4 Alternatively, if player 1 considers playing m1, his maximal regret
is 1. We might then conclude that m′
1 minimizes player 1’s maximal regret whenever
ε ≤ 1/5. However, if ε > 1/6, player 1 can guarantee himself a maximal regret of
5/6 by randomizing between m1 and m′
1 with probability 5/6 and 1/6, respectively.
In other words, m′
1 is not a proﬁtable deviation whenever 1/5 > ε > 1/6, but the
randomization between m1 and m′
1 is; this highlights the importance of considering
mixed strategies. In fact, (m′
1,m′
2) is the unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium whenever
ε ≤ 1/6.5 This simple example suggests that social choice correspondences that are
Maskin monotonic and satisﬁes the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-
minimax regret equilibrium whenever ε is small enough, i.e., whenever the doubt about
the rationality of others is small enough. Surprisingly, this turns out to be true even for
arbitrarily large ε, i.e., for all ε < 1.
4That is u1(g(m1,m2),θ) − u1(g(m′
1,m2),θ) = 5.
5If ε > 1/6, there is a unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium, in which player 1 plays m1 with
probability 5/6 and player 2 plays m′
2 with probability one.
73 Monotonicity and no-veto power
The main result of this note is that social choice correspondences that are Maskin mono-
tonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret
equilibrium for all ε ∈ [0,1). Maskin’s result is surprisingly robust: even arbitrarily
large uncertainties about the rationality of opponents do not undermine the implemen-
tation of social choice correspondences in FNE.
Proposition 1 Let n ≥ 3. If the social choice correspondence f is Maskin monotonic
and satisﬁes no-veto power, then it is implementable in ε-minimax regret for all ε ∈ [0,1).
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple. The canonical mechanism for Nash imple-
mentation features an integer game, whereby whenever it is not the case that at least
n−1 players announce the same message, the alternative implemented is the alternative
nominated by the player announcing the highest integer (if there are several such play-
ers, choose the player with the lowest index). Consider now a proﬁle of messages such
that the integer game applies. The regret to any player is then the diﬀerence in payoﬀs
between his most preferred alternative and the alternative implemented. Indeed, had
the player known the integers of the others, he could have chosen a strictly higher integer
and got his most preferred alternative. Clearly, his maximal regret is then the diﬀerence
in payoﬀs between his most preferred alternative and his less preferred alternative. Fur-
thermore, regardless of the strategy a player follows, his opponents can always trigger
the integer game and impose to the player his maximal regret. With probability ε, the
maximal regret to a player is therefore constant and, consequently, only the regret of
facing rational opponents matters. In turn, this implies Nash behavior.
Proof Since f is Maskin monotonic and satisﬁes the no-veto power condition, it is
implementable in Nash equilibrium. In particular, the mechanism of Maskin and Sj¨ otr¨ om
(2002) implements f. The mechanism has the following distinctive feature: each player
i has to report an alternative xi, a state θi, an integer zi and a mapping αi : X×Θ → X
from alternatives and states to alternatives satisfying αi(x,θ) ∈ Li(x,θ) for all (x,θ).
Moreover, under rule 3 of the mechanism, whenever it is not the case that at least
n − 1 players announce the same alternative x, the same state θ and the integer 1, the
alternative implemented is the alternative announced by the player with the highest
integer (if there are several such players, choose the player with the lowest index): it is
8an integer game.
We claim that the maximal regret a player can experience is independent of the
strategy σi he plays. To see this, assume that the state of the world is θ. Suppose that
the proﬁle (mi,m−i) is realized such that rule 3 applies, i.e., g((mi,m−i)) = xi∗ with i∗
the player with the lowest index among the players announcing the highest integer. The




since player i can always get his most preferred alternative by announcing an integer
strictly higher than the ones of his opponents. Furthermore, by choosing m−i such that
at least one player other than i announces an integer higher that the one of player i
and all players other than i announce the less preferred alternative of player i (i.e.,
m−i = (θj,αj,xj,zj)j∈N\{i} with xj ∈ minx∈X ui(x,θ) for all j ∈ N \ {i} and zj > zi for






It then follows that for any σi, the supremum of the regret is attained in Ki(θ). (It is
actually a maximum whenever σi has a ﬁnite support. But no maximum exists when σi
has an unbounded support.)
Finally, let (σ∗
i,σ∗
−i) be a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism at state θ. Note that
this is equivalent to ri((σ∗
i,σ∗
−i),θ) ≤ ri((σi,σ∗














−i),θ) + εKi(θ) ≤
(1 − ε)ri((σi,σ
∗
−i),θ) + εKi(θ) =
(1 − ε)ri((σi,σ
∗
−i),θ) + ε sup
σ−i∈Σ−i
ri((σi,σ−i),θ),
for all σi ∈ Σi, so that (σ∗
i ,σ∗
−i) is an ε-minimax regret equilibrium.
Conversely, if (σ∗
i,σ∗
−i) is not a Nash equilibrium, there exist a player i and a strategy
σ′









follows from the above arguments that (σ∗
i ,σ∗
−i) is not an ε-minimax regret equilibrium
provided that ε < 1. This completes the proof. ￿
9Conversely, if a social choice correspondence is implementable in ε-minimax regret
equilibrium for all ε ∈ [0,1), then it is Maskin monotonic. Maskin monotonicity is thus
necessary and almost suﬃcient for implementation in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for
all ε ∈ [0,1).
4 Discussion
We conclude this note with two remarks. Firstly, we show with the help of a simple
example that Maskin monotonicity is not a necessary condition for implementation in
ε-minimax regret equilibrium, even when implementation is required for all ε ∈ (0,1).6
Example 2. Consider an economy with a perfectly divisible good in ﬁxed supply
of one unit. There are three consumers in this economy. Consumers 1 and 2 have
strictly monotonic preferences, while consumer 3 has single-peaked preferences. In state
θ, consumer 3’s preferences are single-peaked at 1/2, while they are single-peaked at
1/3 in state θ′. In both states, consumer 3 strictly prefers a positive consumption
over a zero consumption. The social planner aims to implement the allocation f(θ) =
{(1/3,1/3,1/3)} at state θ and the allocation f(θ′) = {(1/4,1/4,1/2)} at state θ′.
The social choice function f cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. Intuitively,
consumer 3 prefers the allocation f(θ′) in state θ and the allocation f(θ) in state θ′, so
that he has no incentive to truthfully reveal his preferences. Indeed, the social choice
function f is not Maskin monotonic, a necessary condition for Nash implementation.
Yet, the social choice function f is implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium
for all ε ∈ (0,1): there is a discontinuity at ε = 0. To see this, consider the following
mechanism: Each consumer has to announce either a state θ or θ′, or an integer z. If all








Alternatively, if exactly one consumer announces an integer and the two others announce
a state, the allocation is the bundle (0,1/3,0) if consumer 1 announces the integer,
6The example is adapted from Sj¨ otr¨ om (1994).
10(1/3,0,0) if consumer 2 announces the integer and (0,0,0) if consumer 3 announces the
integer. If two consumers or more announce an integer, the allocation is the bundle
(1/3,0,0) if consumer 1 announces a higher integer than consumer 2 or consumer 2
announces a state, and (0,1/3,0) if consumer 2 announces a strictly higher integer than
consumer 1 or consumer 1 announces a state.
We have to show that at state θ (resp., θ′), the proﬁle of messages (θ,θ,θ) (resp.,
(θ′,θ′,θ′)) is the unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε ∈ (0,1). Suppose that
the true state is θ. We ﬁrst argue that in any ε-minimax regret equilibrium at state θ,
consumer 3 announces the true state θ. To see this, observe that the message θ is weakly
dominant at state θ for consumer 3 and, consequently, consumer 3’s regret of playing θ is
strictly smaller (in fact, zero) than the regret of playing any other strategies, regardless
of the strategies of consumers 1 and 2. We next argue that consumers 1 and 2’s maximal
regret is minimized at θ when consumer 3 announces the true state θ (with probability
1 − ε). To see this, note that, conditional on consumer 3 announcing the true state, it
is weakly dominant for consumers 1 and 2 to match the announcement of consumer 3.
Moreover, the presence of an integer game between consumers 1 and 2 implies, as with
Proposition 1, that the maximal regret to consumer 1 (resp., consumer 2) when facing
“irrational” opponents is independent of the strategy he plays. Consequently, (θ,θ,θ) is
the unique ε-minimax regret equilibrium at state θ. A similar reasoning applies at state
θ′.7
In addition, it is worth noting that the social choice function f is implementable in
undominated Nash equilibrium (Palfrey and Srivastava (1991), Jackson et al. (1994)
and Sj¨ otr¨ om (1994)). This suggests a possible connection between implementation in
ε-minimax regret equilibrium and in undominated Nash equilibrium (Palfrey and Sri-
vastava (1991)). In particular, we conjecture that if a social choice correspondence is
implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium, then it is implementable in undomi-
nated Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, we have not been able to prove it. Nonetheless,
the following example due to Jackson (1992) shows that both concepts do not coincide.
Example 3. There are ﬁve players, labeled 1 to 5, two states of the world θ and θ′
7The logic of this example can be generalized to show that, in separable environments (Jackson
et al. (1994)), any individually rational social choice function is implementable in ε-minimax regret
equilibrium for all ε ∈ (0,1).
11and two alternatives x and y. The preferences are:
θ θ′
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
y y x x y y y x x x
x x y y x x x y y y
The social choice correspondence selects the less preferred alternative of player 5 at each
state, i.e., f(θ) = {x} and f(θ′) = {y}. It is implementable in undominated Nash
equilibrium, but not in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for any ε. Assume by contraction
that f is implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium by the mechanism  M,g . At
state θ, there must exist a pure ε-minimax regret equilibrium m∗ with g(m∗) = x.
We argue that for m∗ to be a pure equilibrium, it must be that ui(g(m∗
i,m−i),θ) ≥
ui(g(mi,m−i),θ) for all mi, for all m−i, for all i ∈ {1,2,5}. Consider player 5. (A similar
argument applies to players 1 and 2.) To the contrary, assume that there exists a proﬁle
of messages (m′
5,m′
−5) such that g(m∗
5,m′
−5) = x and g(m′
5,m′
−5) = y. The maximal
regret of playing m∗
5 is therefore at least ε(u5(y,θ)−u5(x,θ)). It is ε(u5(y,θ)−u5(x,θ))
whenever g(m5,m∗
−5) = x for all m5 ∈ M5, and u5(y,θ) − u5(x,θ), otherwise. Clearly,
if m′
5 weakly dominates m∗
5, m∗ cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, if m′
−5 = m∗
−5, m∗
cannot be an equilibrium: the regret of playing m∗
5 would be u5(y,θ) − u5(x,θ), while
the regret of playing m′
5 would be at most ε(u5(y,θ) − u5(x,θ)). However, if none of
the previous holds, it has to be that the maximal regret of playing m′
5 is the same of
playing m∗
5, i.e., ε(u5(y,θ) − u5(x,θ)). But then player 5 has a proﬁtable deviation:
he can randomize between m∗
5 and m′
5 and strictly decreases his maximal regret. A
direct implication of the above result is that g(m1,m2,m∗
3,m∗
4,m5) = x for all m1, for
all m2, for all m5. Similarly, at state θ′, there must exist a pure ε-minimax regret
equilibrium m∗∗ with g(m∗∗) = y. Following the same logic as above, it follows that
g(m∗∗
1 ,m∗∗
2 ,m3,m4,m5) = y for all m3, for all m4, for all m5, a contradiction.
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